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Independence + Accountability: 
Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank
Christopher J. Waller
In 1913, Congress purposefully created the Federal Reserve as an independent central bank, which
created a fundamental tension: how to ensure the Fed remains accountable to the electorate without
losing its independence. Over the years, there have been changes in the Fed’s structure to improve
its independence, credibility, accountability, and transparency. These changes have led to a better
institutional design that makes U.S. policy credible and based on sound economic reasoning, as
opposed to politics. In times of financial and economic crisis, there is an understandable tendency
to reexamine the structure of the Federal Reserve System. A central bank’s independence, however,
is the key tool to ensure a government will not misuse monetary policy for short-term political
reasons. (JEL E52, E58) 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2011, 93(5), pp. 293-301.
The key point to remember is that giving the
central bank independence is the best method
for governments to tie their own hands and pre-
vent them from misusing monetary policy for
short-term political reasons.
THE POWER OF MONEY
Money is obviously a vital part of an economy
because it allows trade to occur more efficiently.
Governments have a great power that no one else
in the economy has—the ability to print money.
Thus, the government can acquire more goods by
printing more money, a process known as seignior-
age. This power, however, brings with it a danger-
ous temptation. Imagine that you had this power;
just think of what you could do with it! You could
live a great life, feed the hungry, and house the
homeless. And all of this could be achieved sim-
ply by printing more money. This sounds wonder-
ful. How can it be dangerous?
T
he Federal Reserve has taken unprece-
dented actions in the financial markets
since the advent of the financial crisis.
Noteworthy examples include lending
more than $1.5 trillion to financial institutions
and buying $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed
securities to stabilize the economy. The large
scale of these interventions has brought intense
public scrutiny of the Federal Reserve’s powers
and institutional structure. In particular, many
have questioned why the Fed has the freedom
to engage in such actions without the explicit
consent from Congress or the president. This
freedom from political interference is commonly
referred to as “central bank independence.”
The focus of this article is to review why
Congress made the Federal Reserve indepen  -
dent when it created it in 1913. The article also
addresses the fundamental tension that comes
with an independent central bank: how to ensure
that these policymakers are accountable to the
electorate without losing their independence.
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people who sell things for money raise their
prices. (These prices can apply to goods, services,
and labor.) This lowers the purchasing power and
value of the money being printed. In fact, if the
government prints too much money, the money
becomes worthless. We have seen many govern-
ments give in to this temptation, and the result is
a hyperinflation. Hyperinflations were observed
in the 20th century in Germany (twice), Hungary,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, with Zimbabwe as
the most recent casualty. Such episodes of high
inflation can greatly impair the functioning of
the economy or collapse it altogether. Thus, hav-
ing the power to print money brings with it great
responsibility to respect that power.
It is important to remember that the tempta-
tion to print money is not restricted to less-
developed countries. In fact, the United States
has suffered from high inflation several times. In
pre-revolutionary days, many colonies had the
right to print money and fell prey to their own
excesses. The Continental Congress did the same
during the Revolutionary War. In 1775, it gave the
colonies the authority to issue Continental dollars
to finance the war. Overissuance and counterfeit-
ing by the British led to such dramatic increases
in paper currency that by 1779, the value of a
Continental dollar was 1/25th of its original value
(giving rise to the phrase “not worth a continen-
tal”). During the Civil War, the Confederate gov-
ernment also succumbed to the temptation of
printing money to buy goods. From 1861 to 1864,
the stock of Confederate dollars increased 10-fold,
and prices increased the same. Financing govern-
ment spending via the printing press also occurred
in the 20th century. Shortly after the founding of
the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury adopted
policies that induced the Fed to monetize govern-
ment debt.1 This led to a spike in U.S. inflation
following World War I. These examples show
that the U.S. government has a history of resort-
ing to the printing press to pay for government
expenditures.
Most governments have taken steps to disci-
pline themselves and impose restraints on their
ability to print money to pay for goods. A time-
honored method of restraint was to tie the value
of the currency to a commodity such as gold.
Because the government did not control gold
production, the amount of money it could print
was limited by its holdings of gold. Although
this restrained the government’s ability to create
seigniorage, it also unfortunately tied its hands
during periods of high demand for currency, such
as financial crises (a time in which people wanted
to hold the government’s currency rather than
other assets) or during planting season (a time in
which farmers needed cash to pay for seed, etc.).
Other problems also occurred: New gold discover-
ies, such as during the California gold rush, led
to an inflow of gold and new currency issue,
which caused inflation. Conversely, if the econ-
omy grew faster than the supply of gold, then
prices of goods and services would fall, leading
to deflation. Finally, it is very costly to mine gold
simply to hold it in storage to back up pieces of
paper money. For these reasons and others, gov-
ernments began to realize that using a gold stan-
dard to control the nation’s money supply was
too restrictive and costly.
As a result, governments slowly moved to a
fiat currency system, one in which the money was
not backed by a commodity but rather by the
“full faith and credit” of the government. Under
such a system, the government promises its citi-
zens that it will discipline itself and not resort to
seigniorage to finance government spending. In
short, citizens have to trust that the government
will do the right thing. But trust can be abused;
therefore, the citizenry demanded institutional
arrangements that backed up the government’s
pledge.
That is why most governments took steps to
tie their own hands and make themselves credi-
ble stewards of their nation’s economic interests.
It became very clear that if elected government
officials had direct control of the money supply,
then they could cut taxes and print money to pay
for goods to win votes. Consequently, promises
by elected officials would not be seen as credible.
To achieve credibility and avoid this abuse of
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1 Monetizing debt means the government borrows money to buy
goods and then repays its debt by printing more money. This is
equivalent to simply printing money in the first place to buy goods.public power for private gain, the control of the
money supply had to be delegated to a nonelected
group of individuals. These officials were to run
the institution responsible for monetary policy,
known as the “central bank.”
It has always been important that central
bankers be independent of the political process
to ensure that they cannot be manipulated by
elected officials. However, having such great
power means that central bankers have to be
accountable to the electorate in some fashion, and
accountability requires the central bank to behave
in a transparent manner. Thus a well-designed
central bank needs to be (i) credible, (ii) indepen  -
dent, (iii) accountable, and (iv) transparent.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
AND INFLATION
A key macroeconomic axiom is that sustained
high growth rates of a nation’s money stock in
excess of its production of goods and services
eventually produce high and rising inflation
rates. This axiom was nicely phrased by Milton
Friedman when he said that “inflation is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”
Economic history is littered with countries that
ran afoul of this axiom. A recent example is
Zimbabwe, which saw its annual inflation rate
rise from 24,411 percent in 2007 to an estimated
89.7 sextillion percent in mid-November 2008.2
That’s 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 percent. 
The willingness of governments to force their
central banks to print excessive amounts of money,
or put in place policies that lead to higher infla-
tion rates over time, has been termed the “inflation
bias” of discretionary monetary policymaking.
(See Walsh, 2008.) To minimize this bias, many
governments have decided to give their central
bank legal independence (CBI). But do countries
with independent central banks also have lower
inflation? To answer this question properly, it’s
necessary to calculate country-specific measures
of central bank independence. Many economists
have constructed measures of CBI from a variety
of legal indicators, many of which are discussed
in this article. In a now famous article that was
published in 1993, Alesina and Summers (1993)
found that developed countries with high levels
of central bank independence also experienced
lower average levels of inflation for the period
1955-88. Figure 1 is derived from a figure in
their paper, which clearly shows this negative
relationship.
More recently, as the top chart in Figure 2
shows, global inflation has slowed sharply since
the mid-1990s. However, as the bottom two charts
indicate, the rapid descent in global inflation was
due primarily to conditions in emerging market
and developing countries. In the developed coun-
tries, the slowing occurred much earlier, in the
early 1980s. There were many reasons for the
global decline in inflation since the late 1980s,
including stronger commitments to price stabil-
ity (better monetary policies), higher rates of
productivity growth, and the forces of globaliza-
tion that increased competition and enhanced
the flexibility of labor and product markets.
(See Rogoff, 2003.) As suggested by Alesina and
Summers, increased central bank independence
appears to be another key reason for the decline
in inflation worldwide. As shown in Table 1, there
was a marked increase in central bank indepen  -
dence between the period 1980-89 and 2003.
Although this trend was apparent among
developed countries, it was especially apparent
among emerging market and developing coun-
tries.3 Indeed, many of the reforms that enhanced
central bank independence occurred during the
1990s and were in response to high rates of
inflation. (See Cukierman, 2008.) The move  -
ment toward greater central bank independence
undoubtedly helps to explain the sharp slowing
in inflation in many countries.
There was also an increase in CBI in advanced
countries. However, the overall movement from
weak and moderate independence to strong
independence arose mostly from those countries
that joined the European Union and thus became
members of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Because of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB is
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2 See Hanke and Kwok (2009).
3 The data are published in Crowe and Meade (2007).Waller
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NOTE: Derived from Alesina and Summers (1993).
Table 1
Measures and Frequency Distribution of Central Bank Independence
Developed Economies Emerging & Developing Economies
1980-89 2003 Net Change 1980-89 2003 Net Change
Weak independence 13 8 –5 32 6 –26
Moderate independence 85 –3 19 49 30
Strong independence 0 13 13 0 15 15
NOTE: Crowe and Meade (2007) measure central bank independence on a numerical scale from 0 (no independence) to 1 (complete
independence). For this table, weak CBI is defined to include those banks with a measure from 0 to less than 0.4; moderate CBI is
defined as those banks from 0.4 to 0.8; strong CBI is for banks with a measure of 0.8 or above. The Federal Reserve’s ranking on this
scale is 0.47, and the ECB’s ranking is 0.83.deemed to be strongly independent. Interestingly,
while the trend over the past 20 years or so is
toward increasing CBI, the Federal Reserve has
not become more independent, according to the
measure shown in the table. Still, the U.S. infla-
tion rate has slowed markedly since the 1970s
and 1980s. This suggests that CBI may be neces-
sary but not sufficient to produce good inflation
performance over time—a result that seems to
hold for other developed countries as well. How  -
ever, central bank independence seems to have
been much more important for helping to explain
the sharp decline in inflation rates since the 1980s
for emerging market and developing economies.
A SERIES OF CHECKS AND 
BALANCES
The tricky issue is that accountability means
being subject to some political oversight, which
weakens the perception that the central bank is
independent. So, there is an inherent tension
between having independence to conduct policy
and being accountable to the electorate. Further  -
more, if central bankers are not elected, then they
must be chosen in another way. But by whom?
In the United States, there has long been a
tension between the states and the federal govern-
ment. States were leery of giving too much power
to the federal government out of fear that this
power would be abused. Yet, the federal govern-
ment was the body charged with the welfare of
the entire nation. In response to this conflict
between the states and the federal government, a
series of checks and balances was implemented
to ensure that policy was conducted in a way that
protected both interests. So, it is not surprising
that similar checks and balances would come into
play when deciding who selects the nonelected
officials to run monetary policy and to whom they
would be accountable. Thus, while the Federal
Reserve was created to conduct monetary policy,
it was given a complicated system of checks and
balances to deal with conflicts between the states
and the federal government, as well as between
the legislative and executive branches of the fed-
eral government.
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Inflation
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.What are these checks and balances? First,
rather than have a single central bank, the
founders created a system of central banks. This
system includes the Board of Governors in
Washington, D.C., and 12 regional Reserve Banks.
This arrangement avoided the problem of having
strong federal government control of the central
bank. The idea behind the regional banks is that
the further these policymakers are from the day-
to-day political process, the more likely that
monetary policy decisions would be made on
economic grounds rather than political consider-
ations. Furthermore, the policymakers would be
less susceptible to pressures to create seigniorage.
The opposite concern is that the regional Banks
would focus too much on their own regions (or, in
Fed parlance, Federal Reserve Districts). There  fore,
the Board of Governors (seven members) was
created to ensure that the entire nation’s welfare
was considered. Thus, policy was to be set by the
12 presidents of the regional Banks (those who
served as direct contacts with the states) and the
seven members of the Board of Governors (those
who were intended to have more of a national
view).
Second, who would choose these 19 policy-
makers? One concern of the founders was that if
all of the central bankers were political appointees
of the president or Congress, then the Fed would
not have the independence it needed to conduct
policy in an appropriate manner. It therefore was
decided that the presidents of the regional banks
would not be political appointees but would be
chosen by the citizenry of their Districts in a non-
electoral manner. This ensured that the presidents
would be independent of the political process and
less likely to engage in seigniorage creation. One
method of choosing regional presidents in a non-
electoral manner was to create a local board of
directors for each of the 12 regional Reserve Banks.
Each board, in turn, would select its regional Bank
president. To achieve a broad perspective on the
economic well-being of each District, the board
was to be composed of individuals from a wide
range of sectors. This ensured that the regional
Bank presidents would be chosen based on their
professional qualifications as opposed to their
political connections or sectoral ties.
On the other hand, because 12 of the 19 poli-
cymakers were not political appointees, there was
concern that there was not enough accountability
to the electorate. Thus, it was decided that the
seven members of the Board of Governors should
be political appointees. The president would have
the power to nominate the governors, and the
Senate would have the power to confirm them.
Consequently, this procedure for selecting the 19
central bankers of the Federal Reserve System pro-
vided for both independence and accountability.
Third, a common method for politicians to
entice government agencies to carry out specific
political agendas is to threaten to cut the agencies’
budgets. Thus, no matter how far the presidents
of the regional Banks were from Washington, D.C.,
or how they were chosen, if the Federal Reserve
did not have budget autonomy, then Congress
could always threaten to cut its budget to get the
Fed to carry out monetary policies that Congress
desired. This power of the purse strings would
undermine the Fed’s independence and credibility
to keep money creation low and stable. To coun-
teract this possibility, Congress gave the Federal
Reserve budget autonomy when it created the Fed
in 1913. The Fed was given the power to earn its
own income and spend it without government
interference.4 However, recognizing that the Fed
was creating seigniorage for the nation as a whole,
Congress directed the Fed to return any excess
income to the federal government. To guarantee
that excess income was returned, the Fed’s income
statement and balance sheet had to be transparent
and auditable, not by Congress, but by an inde-
pendent auditing agency to prevent political machi-
nations. Again, checks and balances prevailed.
Fourth, to ensure the credibility of Fed
promises to keep money creation under control,
Congress created long terms of office for the
Board of Governors (14 years) and staggered the
governors’ terms (one expires every two years).
This effectively guaranteed that one president
could not appoint all of the members of the Board
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4 It is interesting to note that, in effect, the members of Congress in
1913 ensured that Congress could not threaten the Fed with budget
cuts in the future. Thus, an earlier generation of politicians imple-
mented checks and balances on future generations of congressional
representatives.and therefore “stack” the Fed. Long terms also
made the Board more independent of the political
process because members did not have to worry
about reappointment. Finally, long terms made
the Board members more accountable: Policy  -
makers who made promises today would likely
still be in office in the future and could be brought
to task for failing to live up to earlier promises.
As a result, long terms gave current Board mem-
bers an incentive to carry out promises.
Last, to prevent the Fed from making deci-
sions that benefited a particular industry or region,
Congress required the Fed to report on its actions.
But to ensure that the Fed maintained its inde-
pendence, Congress restrained itself from mak-
ing frequent intrusions. The Fed was therefore
required to report regularly to Congress; in return,
Congress would not try to influence Fed decisions
on a day-to-day or month-to-month basis. This
reporting structure again gave the Fed indepen  -
dence, yet made it accountable and transparent
to the electorate.
WILL THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
FURTHER LIMIT THE FED’S
INDEPENDENCE? SHOULD IT?
The recent recession and financial crisis were,
in many respects, the worst since the 1930s.5 In
response, some economists and policymakers
have begun to examine the Fed’s policies prior
to and during the financial crisis to see whether
its goals, responsibilities, or institutional struc-
ture should be changed to help prevent another
financial calamity.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was designed
to balance the competing interests of the public
and private sectors. Some were afraid of exces-
sive government intervention in private capital
markets, while others were worried that the finan-
cial sector would have too much influence on
the nation’s economic well-being. In this spirit,
the Act also sought to balance the interests of
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Wall Street (financial) and Main Street (business
and agriculture). This system, by and large, has
served the country well.
Fast forward to 2011. In response to the finan-
cial crisis and recession, some people argue
that power should be further consolidated in
Washington, D.C., to avoid another financial
calamity. However, as St. Louis Fed president
James Bullard and other Federal Reserve officials
and private-sector economists have pointed out,
moving the levers of monetary policy even closer
to the hub of politics could lead to an erosion of
the Fed’s independence and, eventually, poor
economic performance.6
Clearly, part of the desire to subject the
Federal Reserve to greater political oversight is
natural in a democracy—and may even be a
healthy rebalancing to correct misplaced priorities
or policies. Few would quibble with the argument
that, in a democracy, central banks should be held
accountable for their policies. Indeed, if the cen-
tral bank puts in place policies that run counter
to its stated goals, then that will damage the
credibility of the central bank. And to a central
bank, credibility is something that is valued
highly. If a central bank’s policies are not credi-
ble, then the bank will eventually lose the sup-
port of the nation’s policymakers—and maybe
its independence.
As part of the Fed’s accountability to the
public, senior Federal Reserve officials testify
regularly before Congress. As Figure 3 shows, the
number of congressional appearances by Federal
Reserve officials has increased significantly over
the past few years. This development is probably
not too surprising, given the recent financial
market turbulence. In addition, appearances by
Federal Reserve officials tend to be higher during
recessions, as in the early 1980s and the early
1990s. Although part of the increase in congres  -
sional appearances over time may reflect a general
increase in the number of hearings, it is nonethe-
less clear that Congress actively scrutinizes the
Fed’s policies during times of tranquility as well
as turmoil. The number of appearances over the
5 The causes and consequences of the financial crisis have been
studied in depth. See the collection of articles and papers listed
on the St. Louis Fed’s financial crisis timeline at
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=articles.
6 See “The Fed at a Crossroads” (http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/
bullard/BullardWinterInstituteFinal.pdf) by James Bullard, presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.past four years is on pace to be the largest in
about 20 years.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, there have been changes in
the Fed’s structure to improve its independence,
credibility, accountability, and transparency.
These changes have led to a better institutional
design that makes U.S. policy credible and based
on sound economic reasoning, as opposed to poli-
tics. In times of financial and economic crisis,
there is a tendency to reexamine the structure of
the Federal Reserve System. To the uninformed
observer, the Fed’s structure is in many ways
mind-boggling. In particular, it seems counterin-
tuitive that, in a democracy, the central bank
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should have independence from Congress. Yet,
this independence is the result of Congress trying
to avoid making monetary policy mistakes for
political gain. Of course, accountability of public
policymakers is a fundamental principle in a
democracy. It is the tension between indepen  -
dence and accountability that led to the design
of the Federal Reserve, and it has been an ever-
present force in U.S. monetary policy for the past
century.
In the end, the Federal Reserve System is a
well-designed institution, created by Congress,
that keeps the government from relying on the
printing press to finance public spending. It is
independent, credible, accountable, and trans-
parent. It is a nearly 100-year-old success story
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Figure 3
Congressional Appearances and Testimonies by Federal Reserve Officials, 1980-2010
SOURCE: Data compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using the ProQuest Congressional database.REFERENCES
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